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In an era of pioneering environmental and land use laws, savvy 
developers are using the “vested rights” doctrine to circumvent and 
undermine critical public health, safety, and environmental 
regulations. This controversy pits two legitimate interests against each 
other: On the one hand, local governments must have the power to 
pass land use laws and regulations in the public interest to protect 
their community’s health, safety, welfare, and environment. On the 
other, developers who rely on the laws in existence at the time their 
project is approved should be protected from subsequent changes to 
the law that could increase transactional costs and impair their 
projects. In theory, the vested rights doctrine helps minimize these 
costs by “freezing” the law applicable to a permit application at a 
certain point in time. From developers’ perspective, the earlier the 
rights vest, the better. 
While the vested rights doctrine is based on an understandable 
estoppel rationale, developers are increasingly using it as a sword to 
thwart reasonable regulation instead of as a shield against injustice.
Common sense policy has too often been co-opted by opportunistic 
developers at the expense of the public interest—witness the unfettered 
explosion in fracking operations across America as well as new urban 
centers being installed in particularly inappropriate locations, 
oftentimes in contravention of sensible smart growth or growth 
management policies. The situation has become so perverse that one 
elected official argued that manipulation of the vested rights doctrine 
is “the least sexy but probably one of the most important aspects of 
environmental law” today.1
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It is past time that we restore balance to the vested rights doctrine in 
order to prevent the best intentions of legislatures and public policy 
makers from going awry. Local governments must have the power to 
update land use laws and regulations as new information becomes 
available and as public policy preferences change. This can be done 
without destroying private property rights as we know them, or 
imposing unreasonable transaction costs on the development 
community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The vested rights doctrine has become a controversial topic in property 
and land use law, spurring increasing litigation throughout the country in the 
last two decades.2 The doctrine allows a property developer to proceed with its 
project under the rules and regulations in place at the time that its rights 
“vested,” despite subsequent changes to the law that public policymakers enact 
to protect the environment or public safety.3 Based on an estoppel rationale, 
vested rights understandably attempt to provide developers with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that the applicable laws and regulations that govern their 
project proposals will not change once they have already taken steps in 
detrimental reliance upon them.4 Different states take different approaches to 
the doctrine (witness the majority versus minority rules described infra), but at 
heart they all are based on society’s desire to balance reasonable governmental 
regulation with the long-held investment expectations of private property 
owners.5
Unfortunately, the best intentions of legislatures and public policy makers 
often go awry. Increasingly, property developers have co-opted the vested 
rights doctrine in order to circumvent and undermine important public health, 
safety, and environmental concerns.6 In fact, one elected official has argued 
that potential abuse of the vested rights doctrine is “the least sexy but probably 
one of the most important aspects of environmental law” today.7 One need not 
look far to find particularly egregious examples. In Texas, the oil and gas 
industry has successfully employed the vested rights doctrine to evade new 
public health and safety regulations for fracking operations, arguing that new 
wells drilled on old property shouldn’t be subject to current regulations.8 In 
                                                                                                                     
2 See, e.g., Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 633 F.3d 1022 (10th Cir. 
2011). In this case, plaintiffs spent $2.6 million to develop property as a car dealership, but
defendants rezoned the land to prohibit car dealerships. Id. at 1024. Plaintiffs thus brought 
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging that the defendants’ rezone deprived plaintiffs of a 
protected property interest under both Colorado’s Vested Property Rights Act (VPRA) and 
Colorado’s vested rights common law. Id. at 1023. The 10th Circuit concluded that neither 
Colorado’s VPRA nor common law granted plaintiffs a vested right to develop a car 
dealership on their property. Id. at 1025; see also 1350 Lake Shore Assocs. v. Randall, 928 
N.E.2d 181, 183, 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (affirming, after eleven years of litigation, the 
state circuit court’s holding that plaintiff’s pre-development expenditures of $272,022.18 
were not enough to acquire a vested right to build a high-rise property under former zoning 
classification); Cerrillos Gravel Prods. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 117 P.3d 932, 938 (N.M. 
2005) (finding that Cerrillos Gravel did not have a vested right to continue its mining 
operation and could not ignore public health and safety conditions imposed by the county). 
3 4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 32:3 (5th ed. 2015).
4 Donald G. Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development Vis a Vis 
the Abortions of Public Whimsy, 7 ENVTL. L. 519, 523 (1977).
5 4 SALKIN, supra note 3, § 32:2.
6 Id. § 32:9.
7 McClure, supra note 1 (quoting Washington State Sen. Adam Kline).
8 See infra Part IV.D. 
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Washington State, scholars have argued, and courts have found, that the state’s
early vesting statute is undermining the state’s Growth Management Act
(GMA) and State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).9 For example, a 
prominent developer used the sword of vested rights to turn a small parcel of 
land at the end of a single lane road into an “Urban Center” with plans for 
skyscrapers possibly as tall as eighteen stories10 despite Growth Management 
Hearings Board rulings that the site was illegally zoned.11 Even in Napa 
Valley, winemakers upset about proposed rules that will reduce the percentage 
of land that can be used for residences, winery tasting rooms, and event space 
are raising claims of vested rights to evade the new regulations.12
One might reasonably inquire: How did this conflict arise? Why is it 
becoming worse? And what can we do about it? The vested rights doctrine 
originated during simpler times; a time when developers “could swagger as 
ostentatiously as robber barons when it came to developing whatever and 
wherever they wished.”13 Land use regulations and environmental laws either 
did not exist or were not nearly as robust as they are today.14 But as 
communities have grown, so have environmental concerns.15 Developers now 
operate in a much more complex regulatory environment and must comply 
with countless laws, including state environmental impact assessments 
(colloquially known as Little NEPA’s), smart growth policies, and a plethora 
of zoning and building regulations.16
While one could argue that the complex regulatory environment creates an 
even more intense need for strong vested rights principles, this Article argues 
that the doctrine should be modified to ensure that it serves its intended 
purpose—providing developers with the certainty that they need to plan and 
                                                                                                                     
9 See infra Part IV.C. 
10 Bill Willard & Jerry Patterson, Point Wells Monthly Updates, RICH. BEACH CMTY.
ASS’N (Feb. 2013), http://www.richmondbeachwa.org/pointwells/updates.html [https://per
ma.cc/J5GR-9GTE].
11 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 322 P.3d 1219, 1227 (Wash. 2014) (en 
banc) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . uses the vested rights doctrine as a sword 
to disregard the mandates of both the GMA and SEPA.”).
12 See Barry Eberling, Agricultural Protection Ideas Going to Supervisors, NAPA 
VALLEY REG. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/agricultural-protecti
on-ideas-going-to-supervisors/article_cbc2256d-04ea-5b81-aebd-9efb9eca19fa.html [https://
perma.cc/XAB5-U7PD].
13 See Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use 
Permits, 11 SW. U. L. REV. 545, 578 (1979).
14 Id. at 577–78.
15 NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDRESSING 
COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING 
AND ZONING 25–33, 37–46 (July 2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
02/documents/napa-land-use-zoning-63003.pdf [https://perma.cc/G32R-HRDL].
16 Gregory Overstreet & Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest: 
Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1043, 1048–
54 (2000); see also Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Wash. 1994) 
(discussing the “modernizing” of the vested rights doctrine and new regulations). 
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build—without undermining critical environmental and land use planning 
regulations. While different jurisdictions will need different solutions, there 
are a variety of changes that states across the land can make to reform the 
doctrine. First, jurisdictions should consider attaching an economic price tag to 
comprehensive plans or regulations that give rise to “illegal” projects and issue 
monetary sanctions against local governments and developers for projects and 
regulations that violate land use and environmental laws. Second, jurisdictions 
should prohibit rights from vesting when the comprehensive plan or 
regulations that the rights are vested to are later found to violate land use or 
environmental laws. Third, jurisdictions can limit the invidious practice of 
“permit speculation” by expiring vested rights after a certain period of time, 
ensuring that only developers with the actual intent to build in the near future 
are afforded the protection of the doctrine.
This Article examines the history of the vested rights doctrine, detailing its 
various versions. It then explores the benefits of vested rights as well as its 
current perversions, and ultimately makes sensible recommendations for 
policy reform that should be enacted as soon as possible. If we fail to do so, 
we will enable a new generation of property developers to use the cloak of 
vested rights as a pretext to evade sensible land use and environmental 
regulations at a time when society can no longer afford it. A doctrine that was 
intended to serve as a shield against injustice should no longer be utilized as a 
sword for the opportunistic.
II. THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Developing property—e.g., building homes, subdivisions, or a shopping 
center—is a risky and costly endeavor.17 It can take months or years before a 
developer secures all of the necessary permits and approval for her project.18
While waiting to secure project approval, local ordinances or regulations could 
change: commercial property might be rezoned to residential property, or a 
thirty-foot setback ordinance could be increased to a 100-foot setback.19 The 
change in law—such as a rezone from commercial to residential—could make 
the project less profitable, or force the developer to abandon the project 
altogether, even if the developer has expended thousands of dollars on the 
project.20 When laws change, developers incur additional transactions costs as 
they attempt to analyze and comply with the new law.21
The vested rights doctrine, however, helps minimize these transaction 
costs by “freezing the law applicable” to a permit application at a certain 
                                                                                                                     
17 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1048–53.
18 Id. at 1057, 1065.
19 See Erickson, 872 P.2d at 1096.
20 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1064.
21 Id. at 1064–65.
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point.22 “‘Vested rights’ are the legal protections that a property owner can 
rely on when developing real property to ensure that a subsequently enacted 
regulation will not impair the project he or she initially applied to build.”23
The vested rights doctrine grants developers a degree of certainty: at a 
particular point, the applicable laws for the developer’s project will not 
change.24 The point at which rights vest varies state to state,25 with most 
jurisdictions adhering to one of two models: the majority rule and the minority 
rule.26 These are detailed in turn below.
A. The Majority Rule: An Estoppel Rationale
The majority rule is based on the principle of estoppel.27 In order to obtain 
vested rights under the majority rule, “a developer must (1) make substantial 
expenditures (2) in good faith reliance (3) on a validly issued building 
permit.”28 The majority rule protects land use developers who substantially 
rely on a certain body of law at the time they developed their plans from 
changes in the law occurring after a building permit has been issued.29 The 
majority rule has been criticized as “fuzzy” and harsh, and is thought to offer 
the least protection to developers.30
The harshness of the majority rule is best epitomized in a California 
Supreme Court case from 1976, Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South 
Coast Regional Commission.31 The plaintiff, Avco, spent over $2 million on a 
coastal development, obtained a grading permit, and “had completed or was in 
the process of constructing storm drains, culverts, street improvements, 
                                                                                                                     
22 Roger D. Wynne, Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine: How We Have Muddled a 
Simple Concept and How We Can Reclaim It, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 851, 851 (2001).
23 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1043 (footnote omitted).
24 Wynne, supra note 22, at 856.
25 For a comprehensive summary of state by state vested rights, see 4 SALKIN, supra 
note 3, § 32. 
26 Some commentators argue that there are three vested rights doctrines: the majority 
rule, the minority rule, and Washington’s rule. See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, 
at 1045–46.
27 See Hagman, supra note 4, at 523 (“Estoppel . . . supplies the theoretical basis for 
vested rights . . . .”). David G. Heeter articulated the black-letter statement of zoning 
estoppel in 1971. David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of 
Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63, 66 
(stating that under zoning estoppel, rights vest according to the following principle: “A
local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped when a property owner, (1) 
relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the government, (3) has made such 
a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it 
would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which he ostensibly had 
acquired.”).
28 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1045.
29 See 4 SALKIN, supra note 3, § 32:3. 
30 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1061–63.
31 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976).
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utilities, and similar facilities for the tract.”32 But before Avco obtained a 
building permit for the project, a new law came into effect that required any 
project within a “coastal zone” to obtain a permit from the California Coastal 
Zone Commission.33 The new law included an exemption: if the developer 
obtained a “building permit and in good faith diligently commenced 
construction and performed substantial work in reliance thereon” by February 
1, 1973, the project was vested and no permit from the California Coastal 
Zone Commission was needed.34 Part of Avco’s project was in a coastal zone, 
but because Avco had not yet obtained a building permit, it did not qualify for 
the exemption.35 Avco nonetheless argued that “it had acquired a vested right 
to build multiple dwellings on the lot because, in good faith reliance on the 
existing zoning and the permits issued by the city, it had incurred substantial 
expenses to develop and grade the property.”36 The California Supreme Court 
disagreed, and held strong to the harsh principles of the majority rule: despite 
the millions of dollars Avco had already spent on the project, because Avco 
did not have a building permit in hand, no rights had vested.37
Recognizing that California’s majority rule can lead to costly delay and 
litigation that can kill a project, the California legislature tried to temper the 
harshness of the Avco ruling by enacting statutory vested rights for 
development agreements38 and subdivision vesting maps.39 A development 
agreement is essentially a contract between the developer and a local 
municipality to freeze the existing laws and regulations applicable to the 
project.40 When a developer is required to file a tentative map for a 
subdivision, she may opt to file a vesting tentative map to freeze existing laws 
and regulations applicable to the subdivision.41 Both vesting maps and 
development agreements “allow a developer who needs additional 
discretionary approvals to complete a long-term development project as 
approved, regardless of any intervening changes in local regulations.”42 Thus, 
while California follows the majority rule at common law, developers can
obtain vested rights for their projects much earlier in the process by either 
entering into a development agreement with the local government or filing a 
vesting tentative map.
                                                                                                                     
32 Id. at 549. 
33 Id. at 548. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 548–49. 
36 Id. at 550. 
37 Avco, 553 P.2d at 554. 
38 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65864–65869.5 (West 2009). 
39 See id. §§ 66498.1–.9.
40 See id. § 65864 notes of decs. 2 (describing California’s Development Agreement 
Statute).
41 See id. § 66498.1. 
42 City of West Hollywood v. Beverly Towers, Inc., 805 P.2d 329, 334–35 (Cal. 
1991) (en banc).
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However, developers do not always utilize California’s statutory vested 
rights and under California’s common law vesting doctrine, developers have 
much to lose when they do not have a development agreement or vesting map 
in place to protect their project from subsequent changes in the law. For 
instance, in 2015, the Orange County Board of Supervisors (Board) voted to 
repeal a senior housing project that was originally approved by the Board in 
2011.43 Since the project was approved in 2011, the Catholic Church—the 
project’s sponsor—had been entangled in ongoing litigation brought by 
unhappy neighbors, and the project never vested despite the Board’s
approval.44 In Hermosa Beach, California, a local oil developer was prohibited 
from proceeding with its oil drilling project after the City passed an initiative 
banning all oil drilling within the City.45 Even though the oil company entered 
into a lease agreement with the City three years before the initiative passed, 
the court held the oil company did not have a vested right to proceed with its 
project, and noted that the oil company “could have protected itself from 
subsequent regulatory changes by insisting that the City enter into a 
development agreement” beforehand.46
North Carolina also follows the majority rule, recognizing both common 
law vested rights and statutory vested rights.47 The common law vested rights 
doctrine in North Carolina requires that “[a] party claiming a common law 
vested right in a nonconforming use of land must show: (1) substantial 
expenditures; (2) in good faith reliance; (3) on valid governmental approval; 
(4) resulting in the party’s detriment.”48 In 2010, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals made it clear that the common law vested rights doctrine has a high 
bar for vesting. In MLC Automotive, LLC v. Town of Southern Pines, a 
developer purchased property for approximately $1.5 million to open up an 
auto dealership.49 Relying on letters from the local municipality that the 
property was zoned to allow such a venture, the developer proceeded to secure 
a contract with an auto company and spend more than $500,000 to prepare the 
                                                                                                                     
43 Nick Gerda, Supervisors Scrap Controversial Housing Project in North Tustin,
VOICE OC (Dec. 16, 2015), http://voiceofoc.org/2015/12/supervisors-scrap-controversial-
senior-housing-project-in-north-tustin/ [https://perma.cc/Q8BM-7GMA].
44 See, e.g., Foothill Cmtys. Coal. v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. Rprt. 3d 627, 631–32
(Ct. App. 2014); see also Gerda, supra note 43 (“County Counsel Leon Page advised that 
supervisors can move forward with undoing the zoning because the church hasn’t gained 
any ‘vested rights’ to develop.”). 
45 Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coal. v. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447,
455, 475 (Ct. App. 2001).
46 Id. at 464.
47 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-385.1 (West 2015); see also 4 SALKIN, supra 
note 3, § 32:3.
48 MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of Southern Pines, 702 S.E.2d 68, 73 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2010) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Vill. Council for Pinehurst, 530 S.E.2d 338, 343 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000)). 
49 Id. at 70. 
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property for an auto dealership.50 But public opposition to the project grew, 
and the city council eventually rezoned the area so that an auto dealership was 
prohibited on the property.51 The developer sued, alleging a common law 
vested right to develop the property for an auto dealership based on his 
substantial expenditures in good faith reliance on the letters from the local 
municipality that the area was zoned to allow that specific use.52 However, the 
court found that the letters stating that the property was, at the time, zoned to 
allow an auto dealership did not constitute “valid government approval” and 
did not create a vested right.53 Thus, despite a half million dollars in 
expenditures, the developer had no vested right to build his auto dealership 
without valid government approval (such as a building permit) under North 
Carolina’s common law vested rights doctrine. This example also serves as a 
cautionary tale illustrating how the majority rule can (literally) cost developers 
money, and in some instances, derail an entire project.
B. The Minority Rule: Providing Greater Certainty for Developers
The minority rule relies on a bright line fairness rationale and aims to 
provide developers with more certainty earlier in the building/planning 
process.54 Generally, the minority rule allows a developer’s rights to vest once 
a complete project application is filed—even if it is later determined by a court 
or other decision making body to violate state or local rules.55 Under this 
rationale, “a land use application, under the proper conditions, will be 
considered only under the land use statutes and ordinances in effect at the time 
of the application’s submission.”56 Under the minority rule, development 
rights are recognized as “valuable property interests” and the doctrine “ensures 
that ‘new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights.’”57
The minority rule tends to favor developers because it provides certainty well 
before the project has begun, or before the public is given a chance to voice 
concern.
A case from the Georgia Supreme Court, Banks County v. Chambers of 
Georgia, Inc., demonstrates the benefits of the minority rule.58 On August 20, 
1991, a landowner sought written verification from Banks County that his 
                                                                                                                     
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 72. 
52 Id.
53 See id. at 73, 79. 
54 See Wynne, supra note 22, at 856, 888, 932.
55 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1045, 1065–69, 1095.
56 Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056, 1058–59 (Wash. 1994) (en 
banc).
57 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County., 322 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Wash. 2014) (en 
banc) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Abbey Road Grp., LLC v. City of Bonney 
Lake, 218 P.3d 180, 183 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)).
58 See Banks County v. Chambers of Ga., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. 1994). 
452 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:2
proposed project was in compliance with local land use laws.59 Written 
verification was the first necessary step for the landowner to obtain the 
appropriate permit for the project.60 Because “[i]t soon became apparent that 
the County was not going to give plaintiffs the written verification they 
sought,” on September 26, 1991 the landowner filed a mandamus petition 
seeking “an order compelling the County . . . to issue written verification of 
zoning ordinance compliance.”61 A few hours after the landowner filed his 
mandamus petition, however, the County adopted a Restated Zoning 
Ordinance.62 Banks County argued that the Restated Zoning Ordinance 
precluded the landowner from obtaining written verification of zoning 
compliance.63 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed.64 The court held the 
landowner was “in compliance with the County’s zoning ordinances when [he]
sought written verification of compliance on August 20, 1991.”65 Therefore, 
the landowner acquired a vested right to obtain the written verification of 
zoning compliance from Banks County, despite the zoning ordinance adopted 
on September 26.66 The application of the minority rule in this case provided 
the landowner with certainty and fairness, and prevented the landowner from 
being harmed by uncooperative political officials.67
Another excellent example of the minority rule (and its ironic 
consequences) can be found in Washington’s vested rights doctrine. 
Washington stands out across the states for its exceptionally early vesting 
doctrine.68 In the Evergreen State, rights vest upon the filing of a complete 
permit application for three categories of permits: subdivision applications,69
building permits,70 and development agreements.71 This is known as the “date 
certain” approach.72 While Washington’s vested rights doctrine originated at 
common law, the Washington Supreme Court has declared that the doctrine is 
                                                                                                                     
59 See id.
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. at 786.
64 Banks County, 444 S.E.2d at 786.
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 But see id. at 788 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (arguing that the application of the 
minority rule to this case “allows appellees to evade the operation of the Banks County 
zoning ordinance by the mere filing of an application and allows appellees, who acted with 
knowledge of the impending zoning ordinance, to defeat that ordinance,” and urging the 
state to adopt the majority rule). 
68 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1095.
69 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.033 (West 2004).
70 Id. § 19.27.095 (West 2005).
71 Id. § 36.70B.170 (West 2011). 
72 See Hull v. Hunt, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (Wash. 1958) (en banc). For an overview of 
the “date certain” approach, see Brian K. Steinwascher, Note, Statutory Development 
Rights: Why Implementing Vested Rights Through Statute Serves the Interests of the 
Developer and Government Alike, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 284–92 (2010).
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now strictly statutory.73 Even without the common law vesting doctrine, 
Washington has one of the broadest vesting doctrines on the books. “To put it 
bluntly,” one commentator said of Washington’s vested rights doctrine, 
“developers have a sweet deal in Washington.”74
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Whether or not a state adheres to the minority or majority rule for vested 
rights, all jurisdictions recognize the positive benefits that the doctrine 
provides to landowners and developers.75 In Washington, the Supreme Court 
recognized that vesting rights were necessary because “[s]ociety [as a whole] 
suffers if property owners cannot plan developments with reasonable certainty, 
and cannot carry out the developments they begin.”76 If vested rights were not 
granted, the complex web of laws and regulations that developers must comply 
with would essentially prove to be an unhittable, moving target. As a result, 
some commentators have argued that “the economic engine of the building 
industry [would be] stifled, resulting in unnecessary and unfair losses for 
property owners and lost tax revenues for local governments.”77
Development projects can take many years, and the vested rights doctrine 
provides developers with the protection and certainty that they need to 
complete the entire project without the risk that new regulations will make the 
project uneconomical or impossible. In New Hampshire, for instance, a town 
approved a developer’s subdivision plan to build fifty houses on a piece of 
property in 1968.78 However, in 1970, the town created a planning board and 
adopted a new zoning ordinance requiring subdivision lots “to have a 
minimum lot area of 40,000 square feet.”79 The developer’s lots were only 
10,000 square feet and did not comply with the new statute.80 Nonetheless, 
between 1970–1975 the planning board continued to approve amendments to 
the developer’s original subdivision plan and allowed the project to proceed on 
10,000 square foot lots as originally planned.81 Unfortunately, in 1978, with 
70% of the subdivision complete, the local planning board suddenly refused to 
                                                                                                                     
73 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 322 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Wash. 2014) (en 
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approve the plan for the last sixteen lots since they did not meet the 40,000 
square foot ordinance.82
The developer sued.83 Applying the majority rule, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court found that the developer had proceeded “with its original plan 
in good faith, reasonable reliance upon the town’s ongoing approval of that 
plan over a period of years,” and acquired a vested right to develop the 
remaining lots regardless of the 40,000 square foot zoning ordinance.84 Here, 
the planning board adopted a new ordinance after the developer’s subdivision 
plan was approved, and attempted to deny the developer its right to proceed 
with the project as originally approved, ten years later. Here, the vested rights 
doctrine sensibly and fairly protected the developer from the planning board’s
inconsistent decisionmaking.
The vested rights doctrine also protects the rights of individuals against the 
political whims of local government. Commentators have gone so far as to 
state that vested rights “are the jurisprudential testing ground for a much 
bigger issue: the ebbs and flows of the protection of individual rights versus 
the power of the government to impose regulations.”85 Vested rights ensure 
that the government applies the rules fairly and evenly, and “further[s]
society’s interest in the government following the law and establishing 
certainty.”86
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE VESTED RIGHTS 
DOCTRINE
While the vested rights doctrine provides developers a safety net for their 
risky and expensive investments, it comes at a cost to the public interest. Early 
vesting can lead to an invidious practice called “permit speculation.”87
Opportunistic developers have recently begun to take advantage of the vested 
rights doctrine as a way to skirt environmental and land use regulations. For 
instance, a loophole in Washington’s Growth Management Act allows savvy 
developers to apply for a permit and obtain vested rights for a project even 
when the project is later found to violate SEPA or be noncompliant with the 
GMA (and when it is well known in advance that those risks are already 
present).88 In Texas, the doctrine has been perverted to make it difficult for 
local municipalities to effectively enforce public health and safety regulations 
on fracking operations.89 Other states have experienced similar unintended 
                                                                                                                     
82 See id. at 1133–34. 
83 Id. at 1133.
84 Henry & Murphy, 424 A.2d at 1133–34.
85 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1044.
86 Id. at 1056.
87 See Steinwascher, supra note 72, at 285 n.114.
88 See Wynne, supra note 22, at 851, 890–91; see also infra Part IV.C.
89 See John Tedesco, Losing Ground, MY SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 7, 2009), 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Losing-Ground-868529.php [https://perm
2017] THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE 455
consequences90—and we are finding that the development industry relies on 
the doctrine as a sword to evade predictable environmental regulation rather 
than as a shield to protect it from unfair surprise.91
A. Vesting Doctrines Can Subvert the Public Interest
There is an inherent tension between the public interest and development 
interests. Granting a vested right essentially sanctions a nonconforming use, 
and “[a] proposed development which does not conform to newly adopted 
laws is, by definition, inimical to the public interest embodied in those laws. If 
a vested right is too easily granted, the public interest is subverted.”92
A balance must therefore be struck between the private sector’s interest in 
developing property and a local government’s interest in controlling 
development to protect the public’s health, safety, and the environment. The 
late Judge Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit noted that the vested rights 
doctrine must balance these two competing goals: “the public interest in lower 
construction costs that result from providing developers a fair degree of 
certainty about their investments; and the public interest in controlling 
pollution and congestion effectively.”93 Grant a vested right too early, and the 
public interest is subverted. Grant a vested right too late, and a developer’s
ability to efficiently and economically pursue a project is thwarted.
In addition, vested rights interfere with authoritative state land use 
legislation that is intended to prevent sprawl and protect the environment. The 
doctrine “leaves local governments less able to update and enforce their land 
use laws to keep pace with changing conditions and evolving views of 
appropriate land uses.”94 While we understand the need to protect private 
property rights, governments must also have the power to update land use laws 
as new information becomes available and public policy preferences change.
B. Early Vesting Can Lead to Permit Speculation, Leaving the 
Government Unable to Enforce Its Land Use Laws
Take, for example, the invidious recent phenomenon of “permit 
speculation.” Briefly put, permit speculation refers to the practice of 
developers obtaining permits before new, more restrictive laws go into effect, 
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with no intention of actually proceeding with the project on the permit 
application.95 The developer’s only intention is to secure a permit with the less 
restrictive laws, and then sit on the permit until a lucrative business 
opportunity arises.96 It is of particular concern in minority rule jurisdictions, 
where the fear is that “developers may obtain a building permit with no 
intention to build in the near future, but rather purely to secure a vested 
right.”97 In early vesting states, this is a significant risk since rights can vest so 
easily.
For example, suppose a county wants to increase the stream buffer 
ordinance from fifty feet to 100 feet. The county must show its cards before 
the new stream buffer takes effect: it must proceed under a public, democratic 
process including public notice of the proposed change, public hearings, and 
public comment.98 Private developers, on the other hand, can sit back and 
watch the county amend the ordinance, and then simply file a permit 
application before the new ordinance goes into effect. Voila! In a minority rule 
state, the developer’s rights have vested to the fifty-foot buffer, and the project 
is now exempt from the 100-foot buffer.
The Washington Supreme Court, however, has stated that the date certain 
vested rights doctrine prevents permit speculation because rights vest at a 
point “which demonstrates substantial commitment by the developer, such that 
the good faith of the applicant is generally assured.”99 Practitioners Gregory 
Overstreet and Diana Kirchheim argue in their article, The Quest for the Best 
Test to Vest: Washington’s Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, that “permit 
speculation is not a problem in the real world,”100 and others similarly believe 
“permit speculation may be a concern in theory rather than in practice.”101
However, scholar Roger Wynne disagrees vociferously, noting that Overstreet 
and Kirchheim and others who feel that permit speculation is not a problem 
focus on building permit speculation.102 Wynne notes that “a developer 
usually seeks a building permit after investing considerable time in a project 
and at the point that the developer is ready to break ground. When developers 
rely on earlier permits to freeze applicable development regulations, permit 
speculation is a very real possibility.”103 But early vesting for other permits—
such as subdivision applications—indicates that speculation in early vesting 
                                                                                                                     
95 See Steinwascher, supra note 72, at 285 n.114. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. at 286–87.
98 4 SALKIN, supra note 3, § 32:2 (discussing the Sunshine Acts, open zoning 
meetings, and freedom of information laws).
99 Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Wash. 1994) (en 
banc).
100 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 16, at 1078 n.201.
101 Steinwascher, supra note 72, at 286 n.123 (“There appears to be few cases in the 
permitting and vested rights context in which the issue of permit speculation arises.”). 
102 Wynne, supra note 22, at 921 n.278.
103 Id. (citation omitted).
2017] THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE 457
jurisdictions is a real problem. For instance, in 1999 King County Executive 
Ron Sims issued an emergency order requiring all pre-1937 subdivision 
approvals to be reviewed under modern law before the subdivision could be 
developed.104 Sims’s action specifically targeted a subdivision plan filed 
“around the turn of the century” with the township of Ravensdale—a township 
that no longer exists—to allow fifty-seven lots on 103 acres.105 Current zoning 
laws for the lot, located in a rural area near a salmon stream, “allows just one 
house per five or 10 acres.”106
More recent experience seems to fall on the side of Wynne’s concerns. For 
instance, King County, Washington adopted a tougher critical-areas ordinance 
in 2005 and “the number of building-permit applications jumped nearly 30 
percent in the two months before the law took effect compared with the same 
period in the previous year. . . . The reason: to get in under the wire to avoid 
the controversial new rules.”107 In Washington’s Snohomish County, when 
developers heard that “the county council was considering protecting 
wetlands, streams, and other environmentally sensitive areas,” they rushed to 
file permit applications before the law went into effect.108 The county received 
a staggering 616 applications in the two years before the law was passed, 
while only “one-fifth that many came in during the two years afterward.”109
In San Antonio, Texas, the vested rights doctrine has cost the city 
“millions of dollars, stripped parts of the scenic Hill Country of trees and 
blocked attempts to protect the region’s water supply.”110 In October of 1997, 
the day before a new law was to go into effect “to charge developers new fees 
to control storm water runoff and prevent flooding,” developers filed 200 
applications under the old rules—“the most [applications] ever filed in a single 
day in San Antonio.”111 In another egregious example, when the San Antonio 
City Council was contemplating new rules to protect the Edwards Aquifer, it 
imposed a temporary moratorium on new plats over the aquifer’s recharge 
zone “to stop landowners from trying to get around the looming aquifer 
rules.”112 But in the week and days before the temporary moratorium went into 
effect, applications spiked and the city received nearly 200 applications—
compared to an average of forty-seven applications per month.113
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Additionally, developers have used claims of vested rights to avoid the 
ordinance in four out of five cases over the last decade, allowing sprawl and 
“dense development over the fragile watershed that the city intended to
protect” to grow.114 Frustrated environmentalists in San Antonio allege that 
vested rights have essentially nullified the city’s efforts to protect the 
aquifer.115
Simply put, the opportunistic manipulation of the vested rights doctrine in 
Texas, Washington, and numerous other jurisdictions is a prime example of 
the dark side of good intentions. Instead of protecting developers’ reliance 
interests, it perversely “encourages the development industry to blur the line 
between legitimate projects and outright land speculation,” and has served as 
“a boon to developers while hampering efforts by residents, community 
groups and officials to make San Antonio a better place to live.”116
C. Washington’s Problem: The Vested Rights Doctrine Undermines the 
State’s Growth Management Act and State Environmental Policy Act
While Overstreet and Kirchheim argue that Washington’s vested rights 
doctrine protects both the public interest and property owner’s rights,117 recent 
conflicts indicate that only the latter is the case.118 The intersection of 
Washington’s vested rights doctrine with the GMA and SEPA demonstrates 
how the public interest can easily and perversely be subverted when rights are 
allowed to vest too early. Despite noble intentions, Washington’s vested rights 
doctrine is rewarding opportunistic developers and undermining these critical 
environmental and land use policies.
1. The Growth Management Act
Numerous states have enacted sensible growth management acts in recent 
years in an effort to balance private property rights with reasonable land use 
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growth and regulation.119 For our purposes, Washington State’s law is a 
representative illustration. In Washington, the GMA is the “fundamental land 
use planning law.”120 It requires local governments to participate in 
coordinated and comprehensive land use planning to manage growth and 
protect the environment.121 Washington enacted the GMA in 1990 in response 
to the tremendous growth in the region and concern about the “escalating 
degradation of community, environment, and quality of life.”122 The purpose 
of the GMA is to prevent “uncoordinated and unplanned growth” that “pose[s] 
a threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, 
safety, and high quality of life enjoyed by residents of [Washington] state.”123
While the GMA is not perfect, it has been mostly heralded as a success since 
its inception twenty-five years ago.124 And unlike initial fears, the GMA has 
not led to wholesale abridgments of private property rights.125
Operationally, the GMA requires counties and cities to create 
comprehensive plans and development regulations consistent with the fourteen 
goals of the GMA.126 Comprehensive plans and development regulations are 
presumed valid upon adoption.127 Parties may challenge comprehensive plans 
and development regulations by petitioning the Growth Management Hearings 
Board (the Hearings Board), which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether comprehensive plans or development regulations violate the GMA, as 
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well as SEPA challenges to the comprehensive plans and development 
regulations.128
The Hearings Board has two options if it finds the comprehensive plan or 
development regulation is inconsistent with the GMA, SEPA, or the Shoreline 
Management Act (SMA): “(1) it may enter a finding of noncompliance or (2) 
it may enter a finding of invalidity.”129 Most unfortunately, rights that vested 
to the flawed comprehensive plan or regulation are still valid even if there is 
an order of noncompliance or invalidity; the Hearings Board’s order does not 
retroactively extinguish vested rights despite noncompliance with the law.130
In fact, section 36.70A.302(2) of the GMA specifically states, “[a] 
determination of invalidity is prospective in effect and does not extinguish 
rights that vested under state or local law before receipt of the board’s order by 
the city or county.”131 Thus, quite inexplicably, vested rights are still valid 
even if the Hearings Board finds that the comprehensive plan or regulations 
themselves are not. Compliance with the law matters not.
2. The Vested Rights Doctrine Undermines the Purpose of the Growth 
Management Act
The GMA was gutted at its inception by Washington’s vested rights 
doctrine. This loophole allows developers to utilize the pretext of vested rights 
as a sword to proceed with projects that violate the state’s most important land 
use and environmental laws.132 As it currently stands, the GMA incentivizes a 
developer to persuade a jurisdiction to amend its comprehensive plan or 
regulations, and then file a development application immediately so that rights 
to the project vest to the new regulations—before the Hearings Board has a 
chance to issue a decision of noncompliance or invalidity.133 Even if the 
Hearings Board determines that the comprehensive plan or regulations violate 
the GMA, SEPA, or the SMA, the developer may nonetheless proceed with its 
project since its rights vested to the flawed comprehensive plan or 
regulations.134 Meanwhile, the public suffers from a project that violates the 
very laws intended to protect them.135
This is not just a theoretical dilemma; it has already materialized in the 
Washington Supreme Court case of Town of Woodway v. Snohomish 
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County.136 Defendant Blue Square Real Estate (Blue Square) desired the 
redevelopment of a sixty-one-acre parcel of waterfront land (known as Point 
Wells) that it owned in unincorporated Snohomish County.137 Point Wells had 
been used for the prior 100 years for petroleum storage and other industrial 
purposes.138 The land was zoned as “Urban Industrial,” but Blue Square asked 
Snohomish County to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations to 
allow for 3,000 housing units in towers up to eighteen stories tall as well as 
100,000 square feet of commercial and retail space.139 This request came 
despite its obvious environmental contamination and the fact that the land is 
situated at the end of a single lane road that provides the only entrance and 
egress.140 Shockingly, in 2009 and 2010, Snohomish County granted Blue 
Square’s requests and amended its comprehensive plan and building 
regulations to allow the redevelopment project as an “Urban Center.”141
Perhaps this was not so surprising after all when one considers that all of the 
negative externality effects would fall on neighboring King County to the 
south, particularly the small community of Richmond Beach, given that the 
single lane road mentioned above (and providing the only access) existed 
there.142
In response, a local citizens group, Save Richmond Beach, along with the 
neighboring town of Woodway, challenged the validity of Snohomish 
County’s amendments to the comprehensive plan and building regulations.143
The petitioners asserted the reasonable argument that the area wholly lacked 
adequate infrastructure, namely public roads and public transit, to support such 
a large-scale development.144 A hearing before the Hearings Board was set for 
March 2, 2011.145 Blue Square was too savvy to wait—it filed two permit 
applications for the project, first on February 14, 2011 and next on March 4, 
2011, two days after the hearing.146 On April 25, 2011, the Hearings Board 
issued its final order finding that the Snohomish County ordinances were 
noncompliant with SEPA, and invalidated the comprehensive plan 
amendments because they substantially interfered with the goals of the 
GMA.147
After the decision, the Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach 
filed suit in Washington Superior Court arguing that Blue Square’s rights 
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should not vest since the Hearings Board found that the ordinances violated 
SEPA and invalidated the comprehensive plan amendments.148 The plaintiffs 
asked the court to harmonize SEPA and the GMA, and declare that Blue 
Square’s “permits had not vested because the ordinances were ‘void’ under 
SEPA and the GMA.”149 But while the citizen groups pointed to pre-GMA 
precedent indicating that ordinances found to violate SEPA did not create 
vested rights, the Washington Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]he GMA 
fundamentally changed the review process for local land use plans and 
building regulations.”150 Section 36.70A.302(2) of the GMA provides:
A determination of invalidity is prospective in effect and does not 
extinguish rights that [already] vested under state or local law before receipt 
of the board’s order by the city or county. The determination of invalidity 
does not apply to a completed development permit application for a project 
that vested under state or local law before receipt of the board’s order by the 
county or city or to related construction permits for that project.151
The Washington Supreme Court examined this statutory language and
found that “whether or not a challenged plan or regulation is found to be 
noncompliant or invalid, any rights that vested before the growth board’s final 
order remain vested after the order is issued.”152 Most unjustly, the court held 
that the vested rights doctrine applies even to permit applications later found to 
be noncompliant with the SEPA.153
In his blistering dissent, Justice Johnson argued, “[t]he GMA was enacted 
to fight ‘uncoordinated and unplanned growth,’ but in finding that [Blue 
Square] has a vested right to develop Point Wells as an urban center, the 
majority has facilitated such uncoordinated, unplanned, and in fact illegal 
growth.”154 SEPA is supposed to overlay and supplement all other laws.155
But cases like Town of Woodway are clear evidence to the contrary. As it 
stands now, Washington’s early vested rights statute, combined with 
section 36.70A.302(2) of the GMA, actually allows the vested rights doctrine 
to be used as a pretext to completely circumvent SEPA and the other goals of 
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the GMA.156 It is abundantly clear that the GMA and the vested rights doctrine 
must be harmonized so that the state’s primary environmental protection law is 
not eviscerated through the backdoor.
D. Texas’s Problem: The Oil and Gas Industry Is Using Vested Rights 
to Evade Public Health and Safety Regulations for Fracking Operations
The negative consequences of the vested rights doctrine are also on full 
display in Texas, as the oil and gas industry is using the state’s early vesting 
doctrine to skirt numerous public health and safety regulations.157 Texas 
follows the minority rule: rights vest at the time the original application for the 
permit is filed.158 The practice of hydraulic fracturing—commonly referred to 
as fracking—has exploded in Texas over the last decade, but local 
municipalities have struggled to keep their public health and safety regulations 
in pace with the booming industry.159
As fracking operations increased throughout parts of Texas, residents grew 
uneasy as the drilling grew closer and closer to their homes.160 Denton, Texas 
has 270 wells within its city limits, with drilling sites as close as 187 feet away 
from a resident’s backyard.161 Concern about “air quality, water quality and 
the heavy truck traffic” grew.162 Due to pressure from Denton residents, in 
2013 city officials imposed a 1,200-foot setback ordinance to create a buffer 
zone between fracking activities and areas where people lived, worked, or 
gathered.163 But industry officials claimed they were not subject to the new 
1,200-foot setback: their fracking operations were vested to existing drilling 
sites, so they claimed the new setback ordinance did not apply.164
Soon thereafter, the City of Denton filed a lawsuit against EagleRidge 
Energy, LLC for violating the setback ordinance.165 EagleRidge Energy 
claimed that the new setback ordinance did not apply to their fracking wells 
because they received approval from Denton to drill at that location in 2002—
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when the setback was only 250 feet.166 Denton argued that a separate permit 
application was required for each new gas well, so EagleRidge Energy was 
subject to the 1,200-foot setback.167 The City of Denton and EagleRidge 
Energy ultimately resolved the dispute out of court.168 But the suit with 
EagleRidge Energy is a representative example of how vested rights in Texas 
are being employed by industry forces to circumvent new environmental 
safety regulations.
Frustrated that the new setback ordinance could not be enforced against 
the oil and gas industry due to their vested rights claims, Denton voters passed 
a law banning fracking completely within the city in November 2014.169 But,
the fracking ban in Denton was short lived. By May 2015, Texas Governor 
Gregg Abott signed H.B. 40 into law, a bill prohibiting local governments 
from banning fracking (essentially a ban on bans).170 H.B. 40 preempts local 
efforts to regulate oil and gas drilling.171
The legislation does not, however, address the vested rights problem that 
triggered voters in Denton to ban fracking in the first place.172 H.B. 40 leaves 
the vested rights question unanswered: can the oil and gas industry hide behind 
vested rights to avoid new fracking regulations?173 After H.B. 40 was passed, 
Denton Mayor Chris Watts told reporters “[w]e’re right back where we
started.”174
Another avenue worth exploring derives from the fact that Texas’s vested 
rights statute includes numerous public interest exemptions.175 Perhaps a 
solution would be to exempt oil and gas wells from the vested rights statute 
under a public interest exemption. That way, a new permit would be required 
                                                                                                                     
166 Jess Krochtengel, Texas City Seeks to Block Gas Wells in Permit Fight, LAW360
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/482130/texas-city-seeks-to-block-gas-
wells-in-permit-fight [https://perma.cc/2PVS-6HKM]; see also Heinkel-Wolfe, supra note 
163.
167 Krochtengel, supra note 166.
168 The parties entered into a “Standstill Agreement” on November 22, 2013, to freeze 
EagleRidge’s fracking operations within the city until the two parties could come to a more 
permanent agreement. See Litigation & News, CITY DENTON, http://38.106.4.184/departme
nts-services/departments-g-p/gas-well-inspections/news-notices [https://perma.cc/T2ZZ-
C2SC].
169 Krishnadev Calamur, Voters in Texas City Approve Ban on Fracking, NPR (Nov. 5, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/05/361732151/voters-in-texas-
city-approve-ban-on-fracking [https://perma.cc/ UT83-Y3YE].
170 H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); Peggy Heinkel-Wolfe, HB 40 Signed 
into Law, DENTON REC.-CHRON. (May 2015), http://www.dentonrc.com/local-news/local-
news-headlines/20150518-hb-40-signed-into-law.ece [https://perma.cc/Y2KB-G5PK].
171 See Heinkel-Wolfe, supra note 170.
172 Marissa Barnett, Bill to Limit Texas Cities’ Rules on Fracking Heads to Governor,
DALL. NEWS (May 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-politics/2015/05/04/bill
-to-limit-texas-cities-rules-on-fracking-heads-to-governor [https://perma.cc/72FX-8R5C].
173 Id. 
174 Id. (quoting Chris Watts, Mayor of Denton).
175 See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 245.004 (West 2005). 
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for each new well, and the oil and gas industry would not be able to use vested 
rights to evade public health and safety regulations. In any event, legal conflict 
is likely to increase as fracking operations in Texas continue to expand, and 
the oil and gas industry hold fast to the claim of vested rights as a way to avoid 
new regulations. This example from Texas demonstrates the tension that arises 
when vested rights are used to subvert the public interest.
V. REFORM THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The vested rights doctrine serves an important purpose: developers who 
have relied to their detriment on existing land use rules and regulations 
deserve the certainty and protection that the doctrine provides.176 But today,
overall social welfare is being thwarted by manipulation of the vested rights 
doctrine—it is a sword for savvy developers rather than a shield against 
injustice.177 Different jurisdictions require different solutions, but the doctrine 
needs to be updated so that developers are not allowed to exploit vested rights 
to protect their own private interests over the public interest. The vested rights 
doctrine originated decades ago in a much simpler regulatory environment, but 
it is past time to update the law’s approach so that the doctrine protects 
developers’ legitimate, long-term private property rights without rewarding 
their short-term opportunism.178
Fortunately, there are a variety of reforms sensible public policy makers 
can employ to improve the vested rights doctrine. Possible solutions include: 
(1) fining local governments and developers for undertaking projects that 
violate land use and environmental laws; (2) prohibiting rights from vesting 
when the jurisdiction’s comprehensive plan or regulations are later found to 
violate land use or environmental laws; and (3) limiting permit speculation by 
expiring vested rights after a certain period of time.
A. Fine Local Governments and Developers Whose Projects Violate 
Land Use and Environmental Laws and Regulations
One possible solution is to attach a price tag to development projects that 
violate land use and environmental laws and regulations. Fining local 
governments and developers for projects that are found to violate critical land 
use or environmental laws—such as Washington’s GMA or SEPA—would 
disincentivize local governments from making hasty planning decisions at the 
behest of greedy developers.179 It would also make illegal projects less 
economically feasible for developers without banning or stripping them of 
their rights completely.
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This approach has several benefits: a monetary fine would allow the 
development to proceed in certain cases and would not override a developer’s
vested rights but attaches a reasonable price tag to the project in an effort to 
make the endeavor less economically attractive and internalize the negative 
externalities it might impose. Of course, the fine would need to be substantial 
enough to actually provide proper incentives for both the developer and local 
government.
This monetary sanction approach would vary depending on jurisdiction. 
Many states have smart growth or antigrowth legislation similar to 
Washington’s GMA, but each is unique.180 States and local governments 
would need to decide which laws and regulations would be subject to 
enforcement and financial discipline in this manner. In Washington, that 
would most likely implicate the GMA, SEPA, and SMA. Under such a scheme 
in Washington, Blue Square Real Estate and Snohomish County would have 
been fined for the Point Wells project181 after the Hearings Board found that 
the project violated SEPA and the GMA.182 In Texas, a fine could be triggered 
if the project violated specific environmental ordinances (such as regulations 
related to the Edwards Aquifer in San Antonio) or if an oil and gas company 
used vested rights to place a fracking operation too close to a home, school, 
workplace, or gathering place.183
While a fine does not ultimately eliminate the problem of “illegal”
developments and could still result in environmental damage, it attaches a 
price tag (and additional risk) in the hopes that speculative investments will 
become less attractive to opportunistic developers.184 A fine also imposes a 
concrete incentive for local governments and developers to ensure that 
comprehensive plans and regulations (and projects that vest to plans and 
regulations), comply with critical land use and environmental laws.
B. Do Not Allow Rights to Vest if a Recent Land Use Decision Is Found 
to Violate Land Use or Environmental Laws
A recent land use decision (e.g., a comprehensive plan amendment, 
rezone, regulatory amendment, etc.) that is later found to violate land use or 
environmental laws should not give rise to a vested property right.185
Loopholes like section 36.70A.302(2) of Washington’s GMA should be closed 
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so that the vested rights doctrine is not used by opportunistic developers to 
proceed with projects that violate the state’s land use and environmental 
laws.186
One way to close such a loophole is to create a window of review where 
the vested rights may not attach: if the zoning laws change within a certain 
timeframe of when the permit application is filed (say, thirty to sixty days), 
and the zoning regulations or comprehensive plan are later deemed invalid, no 
vested rights attach. Washington legislators have proposed a similar solution 
in the past, but the legislation did not gain steam.187 This solution would 
prevent situations like Point Wells.188 Opportunistic developers, who sway a 
local jurisdiction to change their comprehensive plans and regulations in 
violation of laws like the GMA, SEPA, or SMA will lose their vested rights 
and an illegal project will not be able to proceed.189
Some may voice concern about how the review window will cost 
developers precious time for their project while they wait to hear whether or 
not their vested rights are valid.190 But a project should not move forward if it 
violates land use or environmental laws.191 A brief delay in a developer’s
project is a small price to pay to ensure that the public’s interest is not 
subverted. To lessen the financial impact on developers, jurisdictions could 
limit the length of the window and require the decision making board (either a 
local court or body similar to the Hearings Board) to review the challenged 
comprehensive plan or regulations expeditiously. Furthermore, awarding 
attorneys’ fees could ensure that anti-development groups do not file frivolous 
challenges simply to delay a developer’s project. If the challenged 
comprehensive plan or regulations are not found to be invalid, the developer 
could be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and perhaps even be liable to the 
developer for damages.
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In his 2001 article examining Washington’s “muddled” vested rights 
doctrine,192 Roger Wynne recognizes that the abuses like the Point Wells 
situation are “unfortunate,” but are “best addressed through the political 
process by electing local legislators who will not bend to such lobbying.”193
Wynne feels that the alternative—invalidating vested rights that are attached to 
comprehensive plans or regulations that are found to violate laws like the 
GMA—“essentially reintroduce[s] the majority vesting law to Washington’s
minority scheme.”194 However, this is not so. Invalidating vested rights 
attached to “illegal” projects or regulations does not introduce a majority rule 
into a minority rule state; it simply harmonizes the doctrine with other critical 
land use and environmental laws designed to protect the public interest. If a 
developer’s vested rights are attached to a valid comprehensive plan or 
regulation, the developer’s rights still vest at the early date of filing a permit 
application.
C. Limit Permit Speculation by Allowing Vested Rights to Expire
While early vesting doctrines can lead to permit speculation, setting a time 
limit on how long vested rights last can help to limit such speculation.195 In 
Washington, local municipalities are allowed to create vesting schemes as they 
see fit and set expiration dates on vested rights,196 while other early vesting 
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states include expiration dates for vested rights in their statutes. Washington’s
subdivision vesting statute grants local governments the authority to determine 
when applications are complete as well as the parameters of vesting once 
permit applications are filed.197 Under this authority, local governments can 
limit speculation by providing for the expiration of applications not timely 
acted upon.198 The Pierce County Council enacted such an ordinance in 2005 
and promptly sent a letter to a developer who originally filed a preliminary 
plat application on April 25, 1996, just days before new land use regulations 
were to take effect on May 1, 1996.199 The application that the developer filed 
provided “very little information regarding the proposed uses of the land,” and 
many of the answers on the permit application were “flippant.”200 The 
Washington Court of Appeals held that the expiration of the developer’s
preliminary plat permit was valid under the Pierce County Council’s ordinance 
because “[t]he purpose of the vesting doctrine is to allow property owners to 
proceed with their planned projects with certitude. The purpose is not to 
facilitate permit speculation. Extended project delay is antithetical to the 
principles underlying the vesting doctrine.”201
Some of the vesting statutes in minority rule states specifically stipulate 
when vested rights expire, rather than leave the expiration date up to local 
municipalities. For example, vested rights generally expire after three years 
under Colorado’s Vested Property Rights Act,202 while Texas’s vested rights 
statute allows regulatory agencies to set expiration dates for dormant 
projects.203 In Indiana, vested rights are guaranteed for at least three years 
after the application is filed, but will expire if the project is not completed 
within ten years.204 North Carolina’s vested rights statute allows rights to 
remain vested for two to five years, depending on the size of the project.205
Setting an expiration date on vested rights ensures that vested rights protects 
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only developers who truly need the protection of the doctrine and move 
forward in good faith with their projects, rather than protecting vested rights of 
opportunistic developers with no intention to build in the near future.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time for the vested rights doctrine to be updated so that opportunistic 
developers can no longer use it as a pretext to subvert the overall public 
welfare and avoid critical land use and environmental laws. Now more than 
ever, we need innovative laws and regulations to protect our health and 
environment as our communities continue to grow and strain our natural 
resources. Particularly as urban communities across the country continue to 
grow, the vested rights doctrine will play a pivotal role balancing the 
competing goals of protecting the public’s health, safety, and environment 
while providing developers with the certainty they need to efficiently and 
economically build.206
Courts should not be locked up by an antiquated vested rights rule when 
they see a coup, like the explosion in fracking operations in Texas or the Blue 
Square urban center project in Washington.207 All the vested rights doctrine 
accomplishes in these cases is the perpetuation of injustice by allowing one 
party to impose negative externalities on another without penalty. Local 
governments must have the power to update land use laws and regulations as 
new information becomes available and as public policy preferences change, 
but the vested rights doctrine does not need to be eroded so as to penalize the 
development community. Minority rule states do not need to transform 
themselves into a majority rule state; all that is required is the imposition of 
outside the box reforms to harmonize the vested rights doctrine with 
reasonable land use and environmental laws. We should impose fines on 
entities or prohibit vesting of rights if their land use decisions violate 
applicable regulations or environmental laws, and consider allowing vested 
rights to expire in certain situations to prevent permit speculation. These 
sensible reforms will go far towards bringing the vested rights doctrine into its 
rightful place as a shield against injustice rather than as a sword for the savvy.
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